Bricks4us token sale audit

Bricks4US Token Smart Contract Security Audit

Reading Time: 3 minutes

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Introduction

Coinfabrik was asked to audit the contracts for the Bricks4Us token sale. Firstly, we will provide a summary of our discoveries and secondly, we will show the details of our findings.

Summary

The contracts audited are from the bricks4us-smart-contracts repository at https://github.com/Bricks4us/bricks4us-smart-contracts. The audit is based on the commit 535cf8c62a4cd11625e28a357ab5013f4b4c5c54 of branch master. It was updated later based on commit 86c9524dee9f6d72db4df86826fe79692037999d on branch Bricks4us-patch-1.

The audited contracts to audit are the following:

  • B4UCrowdsale-flat.sol: Crowdsale logic with buy functions.
  • B4U-flat.sol: The token itself

The Bricks4Us token sale will have an initial supply of 100000000 tokens divisible up to 18 decimals. Some minor issues were found which could affect future maintainability and a possible false positive. However, none of these are severe, but we still recommend implementing some changes to avoid future breakage and improve maintainability of the code.

The following analyses were performed:

  • Misuse of the different call methods: call.value(), send() and transfer().
  • Integer rounding errors, overflow, underflow and related usage of SafeMath functions.
  • Old compiler version pragmas.
  • Race conditions such as reentrancy attacks or front-running.
  • Misuse of block timestamps, assuming anything other than them being strictly increasing.
  • Contract soft locking attacks (DoS).
  • Potential gas cost of functions being over the gas limit.
  • Missing function qualifiers and their misuse.
  • Fallback functions with a higher gas cost than the one that a transfer or send call allows.
  • Fraudulent or erroneous code.
  • Code and contract interaction complexity.
  • Wrong or missing error handling.
  • Overuse of transfers in a single transaction instead of using withdrawal patterns.
  • Insufficient analysis of the function input requirements.

Detailed findings

Minor severity

Possible false positive in checkPurchaseAllowed

There exists the possibility of checkPurchaseAllowed giving off a false positive at the B4UCrowdsale-flat.sol contract. If it gets called with a great enough number, the value resulting from executing the second term of the following predicate could overflow:

 

This would mean that getTokenAmount returns a value that is barely enough to overflow, which could get rejected when updating investedTokenOf[msg.sender]. A way to fix this would be by rewriting the return statement into something like the following:

 

 

This issue is not severe, though, as the mistaken value gets reverted when calling the safeMath function in the following line:

 

However, this could make the contract unusable for a buyer meeting the condition until the phase gets changed.

This issue was fixed in the last revision sent to us.

Enhancements

Possible refactoring of hasEnded()

In B4UCrowdsale-flat.sol it’d be possible to refactor the hasEnded() function, which calls getCurrentPhaseIndex() with an ad hoc parameter of 1. It’d be possible to make it have a require clause for that case in particular. It could possibly be rewritten as:

 

This would help improve maintainability since the resultant code is more legible and doesn’t have hardcoded parameters

Usage of current compiler pragmas

The contracts’ code use the following compiler pragma:

 

It’s advised for the development team to update such it and use newer compiler features, like having constructors declared with the constructor modifier and emitting events through the usage of the emit keyword, since they improve maintenance and legibility of the contract code.

Conclusion

We found the contracts to have some minor problems, which are easily fixable. Overall they were well documented and had no serious issues. The development team might want to reconsider on the remarks we’ve made, especially the possibility of a false positive, which isn’t considered likely but could happen. We also found the contract to be well documented and easy to follow. Conditions for inputs were found to be adequate, and phase addition was found to require chronological order, which is necessary for maintaining coherence when calling getCurrentPhaseIndex().

 

Disclaimer: This audit report is not a security warranty, investment advice, or an approval of the Bricks4us project since Coinfabrik has not reviewed its platform. Moreover, it does not provide a smart contract code faultlessness guarantee.

 

Buenos Aires, Argentina @2018 by Coinfabrik technologies

 

 


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