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Avalaunch XAVA Protocol Audit


CoinFabrik was asked to audit the contracts for Avalaunch’s XAVA Protocol project.
First we will provide a summary of our discoveries and then we will show the
details of our findings.


The contracts audited are from the
git repository. The audit is based on the commit
fd9b97ccd963819a282fa5c21bf0545d180f8797. Revisions were made based on
commit 8c9f3c021f0a3366e9f8cfc3fd74163f31b57b40.

The audited contracts are:

● contracts/airdrop/Airdrop.sol
● contracts/airdrop/AirdropAVAX.sol
● contracts/airdrop/AirdropSale.sol
● contracts/farming/DevToken.sol
● contracts/farming/FarmingXava.sol
● contracts/interfaces/IAdmin.sol
● contracts/interfaces/IAllocationStaking.sol
● contracts/interfaces/IAvalaunchSale.sol
● contracts/interfaces/ICollateral.sol
● contracts/interfaces/IDexalotPortfolio.sol
● contracts/interfaces/IERC20Metadata.sol
● contracts/interfaces/ISalesFactory.sol
● contracts/sales/AvalaunchSale.sol
● contracts/sales/SalesFactory.sol
● contracts/utils/Context.sol
● contracts/Admin.sol
● contracts/AllocationStaking.sol
● contracts/AvalaunchColateral.sol
● contracts/IERC20.sol
● contracts/XavaToken.sol

The scope of the audit is limited to those files. No other files in this repository were
audited. Its dependencies are assumed to work according to their documentation.
Also, no tests were reviewed for this audit.


Without being limited to them, the audit process included the following analyses:

● Arithmetic errors
● Outdated version of Solidity compiler
● Race conditions
● Reentrancy attacks
● Misuse of block timestamps
● Denial of service attacks
● Excessive gas usage
● Missing or misused function qualifiers
● Needlessly complex code and contract interactions
● Poor or nonexistent error handling
● Insufficient validation of the input parameters
● Incorrect handling of cryptographic signatures
● Centralization and upgradeability

Summary of Findings

We found one critical issue and four minor issues. Also, some enhancements were

Security Issues

Privileged Roles

The audit encompasses 20 contracts including interfaces and libraries. Contracts
like AllocationStaking and FarmingXava are Ownable. The owner is responsible for
setting sale parameters in the first case, and adding pools, setting allocation points
in the second case.
Other contracts, like AllocationStaking, AvalaunchBadgeFactory,
AvalaunchCollateral, the airdrop contracts (Airdrop, AirdropAVAX, AirdropSale),
AvalaunchSale and SaleFactory make use of the Admin interface, setting an
administrator at construction.
The new AvalaunchCollateral contact further introduces the role of the moderator
who is responsible for approving sales to have collateral as per this contract.

Security Issues Found

Severity Classification

Security risks are classified as follows:

Critical: These are issues that we manage to exploit. They compromise the
system seriously. They must be fixed immediately.
Medium: These are potentially exploitable issues. Even though we did not
manage to exploit them or their impact is not clear, they might represent a
security risk in the near future. We suggest fixing them as soon as possible.
Minor: These issues represent problems that are relatively small or difficult
to take advantage of but can be exploited in combination with other issues.
These kinds of issues do not block deployments in production environments.
They should be taken into account and be fixed when possible.

Issues Status

An issue detected by this audit can have four distinct statuses:

● Unresolved: The issue has not been resolved.
● Acknowledged: The issue remains in the code but is a result of an intentional
● Resolved: Adjusted program implementation to eliminate the risk.
● Partially resolved: Adjusted program implementation to eliminate part of the
risk. The other part remains in the code but is a result of an intentional
● Mitigated: Implemented actions to minimize the impact or likelihood of the

Critical Severity Issues

CR-01 Unlimited Permits Issued for Admin


● contracts/AvalaunchCollateral.sol:135-176,
● contracts/AvalaunchCollateral.sol:192-226

The admin can call autoParticipate() or boostParticipation() in the contract
AvalaunchCollateral and act on behalf of a user, paying with this user’s
collateral. The user only allows the sale (address), but cannot limit amounts,


Include an amount (or maximum amount) that the user allows the admin to use.


Resolved. Developers informed us that this is the expected use. Users must
therefore trust that the admin will select the amount safely in their interests.

Medium Severity Issues

No issues found.

Minor Severity Issues

MI-01 No Booster Round Is Possible

In AvalaunchSale.setSalesParams() we set the boosterRoundId as

boosterRoundId = _stakingRoundId.add(1);

after the following check

require(_stakingRoundId > 0, "Invalid staking round id.");

However, since stakingRoundId may be equal to roundIds.length-1 and
boosterRoundId could point to a nonexistent round, thus rendering the booster
round unavailable to all practical purposes.


Validate that _stakingRoundId is not the last index. Alternatively, revisit the order in
which parameters are set to prevent inconsistencies between number of rounds,
and specific rounds.


Acknowledged. Developers explained that this is an expected behavior and the
booster round is optional.

MI-02 Floating Pragma


● contracts/AvalaunchCollateral.sol:2
● contracts//DevToken.sol:2

● contracts/interfaces/IAvalaunchSale.sol:2
● contracts/interfaces/IDexalotPortfolio.sol:2
● contracts/interfaces/ICollateral.sol:2
● contracts/interfaces/IERC20Metadata.sol:3
● contracts/utils/Context.sol:3

Contracts should be deployed with the same compiler version that they have been
tested with. Locking the pragma helps to ensure that contracts do not accidentally
get deployed using, for example, an outdated compiler version that might introduce
bugs that affect the contract system negatively.


Lock the pragma version, replacing pragma solidity ^0.8.0; with a specific patch,
preferring the most updated version. For example, pragma solidity 0.8.14;.



MI-03 Inconsistent Parameters in AvalaunchSale and SalesFactory

There is a problem if the collateral parameter set in SalesFactory is different to that
set in AvalaunchSales.


Set the parameter in only one contract.



MI-04 Prefer Importing Libraries from NPM

Library IERC20Metadata.sol is stored locally and imported, instead of using NPM
to import it from openzeppelin’s repository. This may lead to errors in copying, or
lose an update.


Import all externally-generated code through NPM.




These items do not represent a security risk. They are best practices that we
suggest implementing.



EN-01 Outdated Solidity Compiler Version

The audited contracts use the outdated version of solidity v0.6.12 (SWC-102).


Consider updating the code to compile with the latest version.


Not implemented.

EN-02 Unused Flattened Library

Flattened old version of OpenZeppelin’s TransparentUpgradeableProxy. If not using
the latest version, devs should specify what version they are using so we can check
for reported issues.


Document the usage of this variable and allow modifications.


Not implemented.

EN-03 tokenPriceInUSD Is Unused and Misleading

The variable tokenPriceInUSD in AvalauncSale.sol is misleading, since it is not used
by any of the sale functions nor needs to have any relationship with
tokenPriceInAVAX. Also tokenIpriceInAVAX may be changed but this cannot.


Document the usage of this variable and allow modifications.


Not implemented.

EN-04 dexalotPortfolio May Be Set Before Sale Is Created

Ensure the sale is created in setAndSupportDexalotPortfolio()

EN-05 admin Array Not Checked For Repetitions During Construction


● Admin.sol:18-24.

In the constructor of Admin.sol it could happen that an address is repeated in the
input array _addresses. If this happens, the same address would be pushed more
than once to the array admins and may create inconsistencies, e.g., when calling
removeAdmin(). We recommend you check isAdmin[_admins[i]] = false
before turning it to true.

EN-06 Replace Integers by Constants

In FarmingXava.sol replace occurrences of 1e18 and 1e36 by a call or a constant
(e.g., IERC20Metadata(address(token)).decimals() as it is done in the
AvalaunchSale.sol contract).

EN-07 Two safeMath Libraries

Some contracts import OpenZeppelin’s safeMath library and others use a custom
safeMath library (math/safeMath.sol) which is a copy of OpenZeppelin’s safeMath
with some modifications. Also, note that some contracts, like AirdropSale.sol, are
importing safeMath but not using it. In that case, consider removing and saving gas.

EN-08 Documentation

Use Solidity’s NatSpec format for documentation (link), removing “todo”s and other
development comments.


● 2022-03-22 – Initial report based on commit
● 2022-04-05 – Revision based on commit

Disclaimer: This audit report is not a security warranty, investment advice, or an
approval of the Avalaunch XAVA Protocol project since CoinFabrik has not
reviewed its platform. Moreover, it does not provide a smart contract code
faultlessness guarantee.

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